

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait

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ABSTRACT

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China is getting stronger. The United States is the only superpower strengthening alliance to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against US and her friends. Historically, what is China's interest on Taiwan? Historically, what is the United States' interest on China ? Historically, what's United States' interest on Taiwan? Within the next 10 years, will China attack Taiwan? If so, what is the strategy? How long does she take to end the war? Will the United States support Taiwan? If so, how and to what degree? What is the Trinity's view to another? What is Taiwanese will to fight? What's the crisis management required?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	III
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.....	1
DEFINITION OF “CRISIS MANAGEMENT”.....	1
HISTORICALLY, WHAT IS CHINA’S INTEREST IN TAIWAN?.....	1
HISTORICALLY, WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES’ INTEREST IN TAIWAN? HISTORICALLY, WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES’ INTEREST IN CHINA?.....	2
WITHIN THE NEXT 10 YEARS, WILL CHINA ATTACK TAIWAN? IF SO, WHAT WILL THE STRATEGY BE? HOW LONG WILL THE WAR TAKE? WHAT IS THE TAIWANESE WILL TO FIGHT?.....	4
WILL THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT TAIWAN? IF SO, HOW AND TO WHAT DEGREE?	6
WHAT IS THE TRINITY’S VIEW OF EACH ANOTHER? WHAT’S THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT REQUIRED?.....	9
CONCLUSION:.....	14
ENDNOTES.....	16
BIBLIOGRAPHY	19

CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

China is getting stronger. The United States is the only superpower strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against US and her friends. The Taiwan Strait is one of the potential flash points in the West Pacific Rim. This paper reviews China's Interest in Taiwan¹, the United States' interest on Taiwan, United States' interest on China². Within the next 10 years, will China attack Taiwan? If so, what will the strategy be? How long will the war take? What is the Taiwanese will to fight? Will the United States support Taiwan? If so, how and to what degree? Finally this paper examines what is the Trinity's view to another and what's the crisis management required?

DEFINITION OF "CRISIS MANAGEMENT"

"Crisis" represents both opportunity and danger. Every nation, every region, large or small, runs the risk of a crisis. Forward-thinking leadership practice crisis management: Crisis management is controlling reactions in an unstable situation in such a way as to maximize one's own benefits while not forcing the opponents hand into war. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962As, John F. Kennedy made every effort to find peace and every effort to give his adversary room to move.

"Crisis Management " is an umbrella term that covers many components.³ "Crisis Management" deals with the actors and reality of the crisis. This paper focuses on factors contribute to reduce the temperatures in crisis in the Taiwan Strait.

HISTORICALLY, WHAT IS CHINA'S INTEREST IN TAIWAN?

In China's viewpoint, Taiwan is Chinese internal affair. The defeated and shamed China gave Taiwan to Japan in 1895. The war time leader of China, Chiang Kai-Shek, took Taiwan back from Japan after WWII. Since the beginning of the Cold War, Taiwan stands on the Western Pacific Rim and threatens the lines of communication to Mainland China. On the other side, at the dawn of Post-Cold War, Taiwan unintentionally contributes to China's recent economy growth. Facing this political-economic combination, it seems to be unsatisfactory, but painfully acceptable to Mainland China.⁴

What is the biggest concern in the Peoples' Republic of China(PRC) leadership? The PRC leadership fears the culture and national identity of Taiwan. What's the significant difference between "Republic of China(ROC), Republic of Taiwan, and People's republic of China"? PRC and ROC have co-existed since 1949, so there are simultaneously a Communist China and free China in the world. Both are Chinese identities. The Chinese in the mainland

are impressed at the excellent performance of political development and economic power of Taiwan.

Thus, Taiwan's' political development is a threat to the PRC leadership. The PRC is eager to reunify Taiwan into the PRC. Their course of action is one of steady resolve backed by a sledgehammer. Thus, while both are China identities, there is only one China in the world. But if Taiwan embraces a new name-Republic of Taiwan without recognizing its Chinese identity, Beijing will invade or destroy Taiwan with nuclear or any means available instead of occupying the golden Formosa.

First, this paper defines the main actors affecting the decision-making process in China relating to Taiwan. Since China has a one party political system, the Chinese Communist Party(CCP), is the main actor in China. During the WWII, the CCP created a military hierarchy to support the one party regime

In the context of regime survival, the Taiwan issue is not the center of gravity. These two regimes have co-existed for decades. The center of gravity in China is economic prosperity. If the economy declines and results in famine, the suffering farmers and workers will rise and overwhelm the CCP. It is horrible and much more invincible than the mighty USA. This is why the PRC is not eager to fight over Taiwan. They have many fears about Taiwan issues:

The CCP elites fear that the dramatic failure of a Taiwan invasion would cause currently disparate domestic opposition groups to link with each other and disgruntled nationalists within the party that could threaten the party's monopoly on power.⁵

Job creation is critical to stability to China. Good economic policy requires positive relations with the United States, Taiwan, and Japan--China's three biggest trading partners. The first day of an invasion of Taiwan means the start of a trade stoppage resulting in countless Chinese without jobs. The CCP, the single party, and the leadership would be blamed for the failure. Angry people can not wait until the next democratic Election Day. The means the current regime would be overthrown.

Thus, deterrence is possible, but not simple. It is not easy to navigate in the Taiwan Strait. Time, however is on the side of free world.

HISTORICALLY, WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' INTEREST IN TAIWAN? HISTORICALLY, WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES' INTEREST IN CHINA?

In 1990, Iraq occupied Kuwait and threatened the oil supply to the West, resulting in a US-led coalition invasion of Iraq, DESERT STORM. In WWII, a USA-led embargo of Japan, resulted in Japans' expansion through the resources rich South Pacific. Taiwan was the initial staging base and air base for Japans' attack of Luzon in the Philippines.

During the Korea War, General Macarthur deployed the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to secure the line of communication to Japan and US from the South China Sea to Korea. During the Vietnam War, US used Taiwan as an initial staging area. Taiwan was a major US base.

Taiwan is now the democratic outpost of the free world.⁶ Taiwan led by example in promoting democracy.⁷ Now, Taiwan instills the free market system into Mainland China. Since 1980, the free market transition of Mainland China seems successful. The next index is the democratic transition of Mainland China through the aid of the Internet. These contributions to regional stability accords with the US interest. They changed the radical regime toward a more moderate regime.

When Hong Kong returned to PRC, the US lost a strategic base in Hong Kong. At the end of the North Korean nuclear crisis in January 2003, there is a potential withdraw of US troops from Korea. The strategic significance of Japan-Taiwan-Philippines is increasing. But the strategic implication is a major source of discussion in Washington during this historical transition. Let us review the lessons learned.

At the end of WWII, the robust ally ROC took Taiwan back from Japan. Immediately after WWII, Europe and Japan underwent reconstruction. On the other side, the war time ally, China, though weak and tired, still struggled with Red Chinese regime which benefited and grew during the WWII.

In the interest of peace, the US decided to terminate the military support of the ROC military as a precondition to balance the military power with the Communist Chinese. The US was too busy to keep supporting the Nationalist Chinese Government. On the other side, under the staunch, covert military and financial support of USSR, Communist China rose and took China overnight. What was the new strategic result? The Marshall Plan revitalized the NATO allies, but the Communist Chinese intervened in Korea and Vietnam.

As a result of losing China, the US had to use ground forces during the Korea and Vietnam War. What would happen if the free world loses Taiwan to Communist China? Will the US put more soldiers in Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines or Honolulu in the next decade? Would Japan and the USA (Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines also have national interests) need more carrier groups to retake Taiwan?⁸ The impact is beyond calculation.

WITHIN THE NEXT 10 YEARS, WILL CHINA ATTACK TAIWAN? IF SO, WHAT WILL THE STRATEGY BE? HOW LONG WILL THE WAR TAKE? WHAT IS THE TAIWANESE WILL TO FIGHT?

In dealing with the knotty Taiwan issue, China has exercised three strategies. First, when China was powerful enough and well prepared, it invaded Kinmen using heavy artillery fires followed by an amphibious operation in 1961.

After the military “Invasion strategy” failed, China applied the “Taipei coercive strategy”. In 1996 during the Taiwanese Presidential election, China fired two missiles near Taiwan to subvert the pro-independent President Lee.

After the coercive approach failed, China increased its fire projection abilities to coerce Taiwan, the USA and Japan together. China deploys more missiles aimed at Taiwan to continue to coerce the inlanders. China deploys more ICBMs to attempt to coerce the USA and Japan from supporting Taiwan. China is also deploying more sea-based missiles to coerce carrier groups not to approach the Taiwan Strait.

Both the military occupation strategy and the coercive strategy are aiming at “unification”. Unfortunately, there is also a fear that China will employ a “destruction strategy” to prevent foreign occupation of Taiwan, which would be viewed as a humiliation and threat to the mainland. China is building up these abilities. The crisis in the Taiwan Strait has a tendency to escalate vertically.

On the other hand, there is a tighter military coordination between Taiwan and the US since Hainan spy plane accident.⁹

This close bilateral cooperation viewed by Beijing that the US might be moving to an unconditional commitment to Taiwan’s security. Fears of being less capable of preventing Taiwanese independence, Beijing in the next decade might have to use force to change the Taiwan Strait balance if an opportunity or vulnerability appears. However, the free world security commitment seems to deter the potential threat, and the risk is an acceptable.

The newspapers, the white paper in the PRC are the guidance for military personnel. According to the statement, all new generation officers are to be trained to invade ROC, including the Taiwan focused exercise. All schoolchildren are educated with the following concept: Taiwan is a part of China. The PRC regime is waging the conflict in information warfare.

During the “SHOWDOWN IRAQ” campaign in January 2003, the US built up 150,000 soldiers in the Middle East. North Korea brought up the nuclear issue to maximize its advantage. The PRC views this as an example of how to escalate conflict and maximize its

freedom of action. If the USA loses the time-long commitment in Middle East , some entities will take the time to do something unilaterally.

Beijing would risk a Taiwan invasion if : ROC political leaders provoke Beijing again by taking steps toward independence¹⁰; the US is busy fighting a major theater war in Middle East and engaging in the war on terrorism; there are labor forces losing their jobs in Mainland China and becoming a destabilizing force for the Beijing Regime.¹¹ This sophisticated major crisis occurs, the Beijing leadership might decide to invade Taiwan.

Taiwan invasion could be a strategic disaster to the Chinese economy. PRC's best "invasion strategy" is to fight surprisingly and win decisively within a week. Beijing understands that time is valuable resource, and time is on the other side-the trade partners, including Taiwan, Japan and America. After swiftly and decisively defeating Taiwan, Beijing would go to the table with Japan and the US to terminate the political crisis and would guarantee to restore the daily economic operations in both Taiwan and Mainland China. Since the US military power was too slow to deploy into the Taiwan Strait, it unhappily accepts the deal rather than risk WW III. That is the end state in the mind of PRC elites.

In the next decade, the USA will commit to an Iraq version of the Marshall plan and continue its homeland defense and global war on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Everything is important and the Iraq is the center of gravity among the issues above.

Meanwhile, In Asia Mainland China is growing confident over its economic development and the international political significance in the global war on terrorism issue. But, it is impossible for Mainland China to complete its democratic transition in only a decade. The free market will change faster than the adoption of democracy by the PRC regime. Whether on the road to transition or as resistance to the transition, domestic instability will pop up. Facing the crisis, the outward resolution to invade Taiwan seems to be the answer. Hence, during the next 10 years, the likelihood of China to invade Taiwan is high. In past few decades, time was on the side of development free market and democracy throughout the world, including China. In the next decade, the Chinese will be more dependent on free market. The Communist China regime will find its road to transit into moderate and peaceful regime. Thus how to leverage the pop up crisis is critical to the success of regional stability.

Some strategists worry about the will of the populace in Taiwan. Just remember she is a democracy country. People understand that "Freedom is not cheap". Since 1949, there has not been an operation to support Taiwan against PRC(except military sales from US, an important support) in the Taiwan Strait. The ROC armed forces alone repelled the PRC invasion in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s.

These military victories mean the significance of self sufficient for the islanders. In the disarm Iraq campaign in 2003, though anti-US sentiment in South Korea, Middle East, US support is highly welcomed in the heart of the islanders. Since the self sufficient strategy exercised four decades ago, the islanders never expect any outside support.

When the Roman Empire employed "lime strategy in the front line by local forces, , mobile strike by the legions." , the local forces never expected to win and take initiative, the legions were too busy to put out fires elsewhere. The Russia and Mainland China can employ defend in depth and trade terrain for time. Taiwan and Israel can not trade any terrain for time. The islanders are always determined to win and survive.

The intense investment and 2003 direct link between civil companies in the Taiwan Strait, simply means "freedom of access the free market in Mainland China, or Vietnam". Once Taiwan is attacked by PLA, it is a war. People need "Freedom to move in their country, their homeland".

WILL THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT TAIWAN? IF SO, HOW AND TO WHAT DEGREE?

The significance of Taiwan is always changing in accordance with the changing world and USA national interests.

USA/ ROC vs. Japan in WWII. Did the USA and ROC fight on the same side in WW II? Yes, during WWII, the Flying Tigers and 14th Air Force fought against Japan side by side with ROC pilots. PRC was the strong ally in the Asia Pacific Theater. Together, they defeated the Japan and saved ROC.

On the other hand, the Chinese Communists did not cooperate with the US military for a single day, rather Chinese Communists cooperated with Soviet Union. Both were creating opportunity to grow up and dominate China first, then the rest of Asia.

General Marshall vs. "Agrarian Reformers" immediately after the wars' end. Immediately after WW II, Russia transformed resources into the Communist Chinese superpower to prepare the swift defeat of the weakened Nationalist Chinese. On the other hand, the US was focusing on reconstructing Japan and European. When General Marshall went to China to mediate the China Civil War, the "Agrarian reformer" paradox seemed attractive the father of the "Marshall Plan". Thus, the trouble making Nationalist Chinese were deprived of any US support as a prerequisite for peace. Since time was on Communist Chinas' side, soon after the constraints put on the ROC in 1949, the Communist Chinese easily defeated the ROC.

By December 9, 1949, the US wartime ally, the ROC was driven into Formosa. Shortly afterward, the American press carried a story that the loss of Formosa to Communist was to be

anticipated, the island was of no strategic interest. Formosa is exclusively the responsibility of Chinese government. Formosa has no special military significance.

The Marshall plan and NATO constitution assure the peace among European countries. On the other side, the US did not recognize the PRC until 1979 and the US relationship with PRC, since the end of WWII, has been a tragic one. The US deployed Armed Forces into Korea to fight a savage war, and now over 37, 000 US forces are still forward deployed there dealing Communist threat. The US lost 50,000 lives in Vietnam, a tragedy dating back to the strategy of favoring Communist China.

McArthur vs. President Harry Truman in the Korea War. Soon after dominating the Chinese sovereignty, the Chinese Communists put their finger in Korean. Douglas McArthur, the commander -in- chief visited the Formosa(Taiwan) and realized the strategic importance of Formosa. However, because of the strategic commitment in European reconstruction and a desire to prevent provocation with Communist China, President Harry Truman had a different viewpoint :

- The United States has not encroached on the territory of China, nor has the United States taken aggressive action against China.
- The United States has a record through history of friendship for the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions of Chinese reciprocate that.
- The United States would welcome the United Nations considerations of the case of Formosa.
- Formosa is now at peace and will remain so unless someone resorts to force. If the Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa we shall support and assist that study.¹²

But, at Cairo on December 1, 1943, an agreement was entered into between the United States, China, and the United Kingdom, representing respectively by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang, and Primer Minister Churchill. The agreement which they all signed read in part as follows:

“It is their purpose that Japan shall be striped of all the islands in the Pacific which she had seized or occupied since the begging of the First World War in 1914, and that the territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores , shall be restored to the Republic of China.”¹³

This meant the ROC owned the Formosa by the terms of agreement at Cairo. Finally, the Joint Chief of Staff shared the Strategic Importance of Formosa expressed by Douglas McArthur, and officially recommended that the island and its disposition be kept out of any

political bargaining at a forthcoming meeting of foreign ministers. “ The strategic consequences of a Communist-dominated Formosa would be so seriously detrimental to United States security that in the opinion of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States should not permit the disposition of Formosa to be recommended in the first instance or decided by any commission or agency of the United Nations.” ¹⁴

To neutralize Formosa, which in effect protected the Red China mainland from being attacked by Chiang Kai-Shek's force of one million men, Washington deployed the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. As a result, Red China released two great Red armies assigned to the coast defense for central China and made them available for use in Korea. Today, the North Koreans expel nuclear inspectors and have made the war on Iraq more complicated. The Red Korea is still a problem.

President Jimmy Carter recognized the PRC in 1979. The Congress passed the Taiwan Reaction Act.

Early in 2001, before 9/11 terror attack, President George W. Bush vowed to protect Taiwan at any risk. The hard line went down quickly. As the long-term Open Door Policy continues, the US has significant economic interests in Mainland China. The American President has to create more jobs for his citizens. The US was forced to declare a “One China” policy. That means that US will not support Taiwan in the conflict caused by Taiwanese declaration of independence. The latest magnification of bargaining “Is China a next major market or next major threat?” is still happening in Washington circles.

Given a status quo without a clear guideline, it will be a crucial task to manage a potential Taiwan Strait crisis. The US will support the ROC at the lowest risk of fighting with Mainland China.

After WWII, the Truman Authority recognized PRC in Mainland China. As a Consequence, the US did not support the ROC in reunifying PRC or defending ROC.

During the Korea war, as a consequence of the cold war “containment strategy”, the US provided ROC with the brand new M110-8 inch self propelled artillery and F104 equipped with new IR missiles. On the front line, the ROC unilaterally defeated the PRC invasion. During the cold war, sailing the Taiwan Strait was an easy and no casualty mission for the 7th Fleet. After the PRC became a member of the UN Security Committee three decades ago, there has been not a single USA soldier in the ROC or Taiwan Strait. ¹⁵

In 1996, in response to the Taiwan Relationship Act against the PRC missile test, the USS NIMITZ and reinforcing USS INDENPENDENCE moved to the Taiwan Strait. It was a high effect / low risk mission.

To reduce the possibility of US involvement in the future, the US is helping the ROC build robust military power. On the other hand, like the Republic of Korea, the bounded ROC is not permitted to build preemptive weapons, including Medium Range Ballistic Missile, and Nuclear Weapons which were dismantled in the bud three decades ago by US. On the other side, the PRC and North Korea, develop the preemptive abilities.

In so doing, it is predictable that after the ROC suffers the PRC preemptive attack, US will be forced to take action to support ROC, even of this is unilateral. Like most setting, the US will only commit its effort at the last moment.

Since the strategy objective is deterrence in a crisis, the maximum effort is two carrier group and an USAF wing, no boots on the ground. It is enough to dissuade the PRC air initiative. Beyond that, any more commitment will endanger the homeland security and global WOT effects. As a result of this analysis, "Preemptive Dissuasion and Timely Support" is the best National Strategy for USA.¹⁶ Further more, any vital national interest threatened elsewhere, like the Middle East oil crisis, will offset US effort in the Taiwan Strait. Basically, the ROC is required to have a robust self-defense capability as it had during the past five decades.

WHAT IS THE TRINITY'S VIEW OF EACH ANOTHER? WHAT'S THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT REQUIRED?

Basically, the economic interdependence and integration between the PRC and ROC continues. Also, the trade between the US and PRC increases. On the other hand, the political and military confrontation between the PRC and US/ROC goes on. The focal point of crisis management is how to reduce "the temperature in the crisis." Even the best theory does not offer a panacea that can be used in all circumstances. This paper contributes to reduce the temperature for the decision-maker by finding the rules relevant to crisis management in the Taiwan Strait.

Pueblo spy-ship Incident: It was a relevant lesson learned. On January 23, 1968, the USS PUEBLO, a spy ship was fired upon and captured by North Korea forces in international waters. To protect the 83-crew, Washington yielded to a North Korea request for an apology and promised not to invade the North Korean waters again. The incident quickly receded into history.

North Korea behaved primary out of its own domestic interest and not as a part of larger Communist conspiracy planned and orchestrated from Beijing or Moscow. Following that paradigm, North Korea will not necessarily comply with a solution offered by Beijing or Moscow in a future Nuclear crisis.

Similarly, we can predict how the PRC will behave in a situation. In crisis management, we can predict that domestic issues will be the first concern both in Communist regimes and democratic allies and friends, including PRC and ROC. The temperatures go up and down by the decisions and behaviors which primarily root from will of the people. In the Far East, many leaders believe Confucius saying "The will of people is changing all the time. Like the nature of water, water afloat the ship in peaceful moment; on the other hand, water can sink the ship in a hurricane." The will of the people is the center of gravity relevant to all national power, even in the Communist regime.

1996 missile Crisis. In March 1996, during the ROC presidential election, China fired a series of missiles into areas near major Taiwanese seaports. In response, the U.S sent a two-carrier task force to the vicinity of Taiwan Strait to discourage any precipitous action by the PRC. The deterrence successfully reduced the high alert temperatures.

During the crisis, ROC did not get any vocal support from Asian countries. In the recent bilateral US-PRC conference, PRC was pleased with bilateral effort to defeat terrorist, but strongly refused to withdraw any missile deployment aiming at Taiwan, a domestic conflict viewing third party efforts as intervention. Not any country or organization, except US continues its effort to negotiate with PRC/ROC. US are vital to Taiwan Strait security.

Feared Factor concerning transition of power. The 2000's ROC presidential election followed a peaceful transition from the old guard, the Kuomintang to a new regime. The episode demonstrated some critical points in the way the military hierarchy ensures stability. Thirty minutes before the end of election, before the votes were counted, the single highest four star general in the ROC armed forces, General Tan declared through TV that "The winner will be the peoples' selection, and will be the commander of Armed Forces regardless of its party." It was a great trust building generation between the political and military organizations. That speech continues the effort to pave the way for civil-military leadership.

During the presidential campaign, quite a few senior officials and officers worried about losing positions. Most of them were strong supporters of the old regime. But, these leaders respected the peoples' decision. The old cabinet members resigned peacefully with best wishes to their successors.

Can the Red China regime do that? Is that a threat to the old regime? Absolutely, Mainland China is in hyper-vigilance status. Whenever an old regime changed in Japan / Korea/ Russia/ Vietnam, it posed a reflected threat to the Red China old regime, the CCP. All senior officers and officials in Mainland China are barriers to democracy. It is a change against personal privileges.

In the North Korea Nuclear crisis in February 2003, PRC will not deliver any word that risks the instability of the North Korea regime, the like minded regime. Again, concerning the regime stability, they are afraid of the “domino effect”.

The ROC democracy illustrated an unknown future to the PRC leadership, the old and powerful generation. Because of that fear, they are determined to employ national power to defeat Taiwan. The China_defensive behavior will roar in future crisis in the Taiwan Strait. These policy maker frighten the population. The fear factor is high in Beijing. The democracy fear factor rise the temperatures obviously.

On the other hand, Mainland China needs Taiwanese expertise, which could also cause political change. Controversially, Taiwanese enterprises with great experience are “invading” Mainland China now both politically and economically. During the presidential election campaign, numerous managers in Mainland China traveled back to homeland Taiwan to cast their vote. These businessmen demonstrated how the democracy system works to their employees. These democracy seeders work, eat, and study together with their mainland employees 24 hours a day 7 days a week. These economic actors will play with significant influence. They are also freedom fighters across the front line and rear areas. They reduce the cross-strait temperature behind the scene.

Crisis Management in Hainan Spy-plane Incident. Vocal support for the US position was notably absent in Asia. Even Washington’s allies, including Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Philippines, declined to stand on the American side when the crisis erupted. This sort of behavior has become a pattern. After the cold war, these allies have increasing economic interests in China. They don’t want to make Beijing angry, or even harm their commerce exchange with China by supporting US policy on any issue.

In summary, the East Asia allies seek the best of both worlds, they don’t want any serious tensions between China and US. Their pattern of behavior will be predictable in the next crisis in the Taiwan Strait.

President George W. Bush patiently declared “very sorry”, and saved the crew and terminated the crisis though understanding that the dead aggressive pilot should take the blame. This implies that a “sorry expression” by both leaders of PRC and ROC would reduce the temperatures and reach a surprising resolution in a crisis. It is easy to act as a hard liner and win the domestic support. By the same token for reputation, King Phillip of the Spanish Empire, decided to invade Dutch and British and lost the war.

Will Hu Jin-Tao say very sorry to “Taiwanese”? Absolutely, if needed. But it would be very difficult to say sorry to “ROC”. It is difficult to justify his soft strategy. Whereas it would be

possible for President Chen Sui-bien to express "very sorry" to PRC Regime and its people if needed. The "Sorry Strategy" could reduce the temperature.

Ambiguity vs. Misapprehension. After President George W. Bush expressed the US commitment to Taiwan in 2001, that is a strong statement against long-term ambiguity. This clearly signals to PRC and prevent possible invasion in the next coming years. The backup expression of "One China" policy by Bush Administration, persuade PRC from being confrontation with USA and persuade ROC from further independence.

In the missile crisis in 1996, two US Carrier Groups deployed to the Taiwan Strait were able to deter the potential conflict. The "Clarity Strategy" reduced the temperature. This physical military presence worked better than thousands of words.

Bilateral fear factor. Any close bilateral conferences with the US will highlight the fear to the third parties, either China or Taiwan. China always keeps a close watch on the US / Taiwan arms sales conferences. Now, China considers the War On Terror as the only right spot to bring better relations with US and take some other advantages as well.

To improve the PRC support, the US should view Uighur Muslim separatists in China as terrorist, cutback the arms sales to Taiwan and persuade Israel to sell AWACS to PRC.

Although the US obviated the need for any trade-off, China muddled through key requests except that the arms sale-remain unfulfilled. In a quid pro quo with Beijing, US acquiesced when Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian was not invited to the Shanghai summit of the Asia-Pacific Economy Cooperation forum in October 2001. Israel is reviewing the arms sale to PRC. The bilateral channel is the single functional channel which sensitively regulates temperatures.

Short range missile fear factor. There are 400 plus short range missiles aiming at seaports, airports, the capital, nuclear power plants, dams, and the military facilities in Taiwan. The missile threat is a significant concern within National Defense Ministry, ROC. Hence in 2002, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian led a public missile protest. The war on missile terror is now being fought in the public forum. The civil- military communities have fused over the real threat.

This disposition will trigger the conflict vertically. This threat lends legitimacy to preemption. For example, during the Cuba missile crisis, the US preemptive responses almost resulted in mass destruction. The populace supported the defensive preemption in this case.

During the past few years, defensive Taiwan has disciplined absolute restraint in facing the daily threat. However, the uncertainty and fears of crisis suggests that any preemptive or destructive counterattack will win the public support. In order to nip a potential conflict in the

bud, missiles should be removed from South- East China and put in check. The missile threat continuously warms up the temperature that could trigger unexpected response horizontally by maculation.

WMD and Missile fear factor. In a crisis, any display of force in concert with Ballistic Missile strategic activities between US and China will unintentionally increase the temperature. Some PRC experts proposed strategic deterrence by threatening missile attack on Los Angeles as a means of persuading the US to agree to “reunification”. On the other side, the US perceived the 911 attack as a war behavior. The US homeland is considered by American as a sanctuary beyond any challenge and threat. “Freedom From Fear” is a national value that guides the national interest. The perception that missiles are aiming at Los Angeles, in response to a preemption strategy, will cause this Cuba like crisis escalates to conflict. It is a lose-lose-lose result.

Economical interdependence and Appreciation. History is a series of unintended consequences. ROC business owners began to set up factories in Mainland China in 1980. The trickle became a flood as a result of Beijing’s economic reform, led by Hong Kong behind the scenes and cheaper labor forces. There is mass transfer of Taiwan’s industry and people.

“Since the end of the Cold War, politics has been driven by economics instead of the other way around. It is no different in Asia now that China has opened its doors. Despite the fact that their politics clash, Taiwan’s economy is being knit together with China’s.”¹⁷

China needs Hong Kong to set up banking system. Mainland China wants Taiwan’s capital and its technological expertise. However officially, there is a great divide. The general policy now is to be confident and patient in Mainland China. Beijing is starting to realize that its goal of absorbing Taiwan is best served by letting the economic process proceed; not by hurling threats against Taiwan. Politics are shifting as fast as technology and job immigration. Economic interdependence will reduce temperature in the confrontation. Economic concern will provide room to withdraw in a future crisis. In February 2003, Taiwan’s China Airlines, the government- owned company began the private business as direct flight to the Mainland China. Both sides are reducing the temperatures of relationship through economic connection.

The will of the populace. How can we leverage the huge Taiwanese investment in PRC? In a crisis, it will be of low risk to maximize deterrence options through exploiting information operations. The target audience of information operations is the populace. Psychology operations are at the heart of information warfare. A specific strategy aiming at reducing the potential hostility is critical to the success of information operations. This paper reviews some critical events.

After WWII, the US Secretary of Defense, General Marshall submitted economy reconstruction plans. The Western European Countries bought the deal without hesitation. Whereas, the Uncle Stalin-centered Eastern European countries did not trust the Americans. Now, Eastern countries are not in good shape. They are working hard. But, it is hard without the robust support that could have come from Marshall Plan.

For the same token, Russia-centered Mainland China closed her doors and chose the wrong approach. It was easy for Mao Tze Dong to take Chinese sovereignty, but it was hard to feed the people. During the cold war, for political reasons, it was difficult for Mainland China to accept investment from the US and Japan. Chinese, practically whose families who directly suffered the Nang-King Massacre hated Japanese. The US has operated a "Strategy Containment". Life was tough.

Witnessing the free market economy miracle in 1980, the successor of Mao Tze Dong, Deng Shau-Ping decided to adopt a free market in Communist China. The Communist Russia regime did not have a convincing example to follow, it collapsed. As a result, the old regime changed.

Only Chinese Taiwanese successful story can silently break down the wall of Mao Tze Dong. While the Communist China regime is leveraging these money making Taiwanese businessmen to blackmail the Taiwanese regime, the Mainland Chinese population does not support this. Concerning economy, the Taiwanese side has significantly contributed to the Chinese through a "Modern Marshall Plan". This interdependence compression undermines the crisis. The Chinese should be carefully educated and appreciate the contribution.

Vocal challenge VS physical threat. Any vocal challenges between ROC and PRC would provoke hostilities. China's behavior in warning that "PRC will invade Taiwan if the Taiwanese government continues to resist negotiation on the unification issue." will strikes at the heart of all Taiwanese. This vocal challenge will not dissuade ROC from independence but increase the temperature in the island.

CONCLUSION:

In light of regime change in PRC, Taiwan represents a better example than U.S., Japan, USSR, Hong Kong, Singapore, French and South Korea, and offers profound influence. The Chinese Regime can be changed to a moderate regime. The Chinese regime can be handed off to new authority, peacefully, and maintain its sovereignty.

In light of free market system in PRC, Vietnam and North Korea, Taiwan represents the more significant example than U.S., Japan, USSR, Hong Kong, Singapore, French and South Korea, and offers assistance.

In the ancient Mediterranean, the people in Athens spread the free trade system and the democratic system which we live upon today. Now, Taiwan is spreading the same seed in the Western Pacific Rim, especially the PRC and Vietnam.

Though time is on the side of free markets and democracy, Marxist thought is still popular in the PRC, North Korea and Vietnam and Maoists is still prevail in Mainland China, especially in the military. Like ancient democratic Athens, Taiwan has its inherent weakness in slow decision making and defensive operations. Like the ancient Spartan dictatorship, the PRC have an advantages in quick decision making and offensive operations. Long term human value is more important than short term national interest. The free world should side with Taiwan and build up its strong defense abilities. The defensive build up is a necessary to gain time, and the risk is worthy.

Word counts 6,265

ENDNOTES

¹ Taiwan represents Republic of China, ROC.

² China represents People's Republic of China, PRC.

³ [http://www.crisismanagement.com/Management Versus Communitations.html](http://www.crisismanagement.com/Management_Versus_Communitations.html)

⁴ Yoshihisa Amae; Kate Zhou; Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis; The Journal of Asian Studies; Ann Arbor; Aug 2001; "Friedman may have been right at the time of writing the article, but now a growing number of Chinese government leaders, including military leaders, have begun to voice reluctance to use military means to solve the Taiwan issue because of concern for the economic consequences of military confrontation."

⁵ Thomas J. Christensen, The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2002

⁶ James H Hughes; The People's Republic of China confronts Taiwan

The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies; Washington; Summer 2001; "But while Beijing sees Taiwan as a door opening on to the western Pacific, the United States sees it as an outpost of democracy, and has maintained strong historical ties with its government."

⁷ James H Hughes; The People's Republic of China confronts Taiwan

The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies; Washington; Summer 2001; "The election of Chen Shui-bian as president marked the transition of Taiwan into a full-fledged, modern democracy."

⁸ James H Hughes; The People's Republic of China confronts Taiwan

The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies; Washington; Summer 2001; "Taiwan is located in a position of great strategic importance. During World War II the island was used as a staging area for Japan's invasion of the Philippines, Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies, and as a base for Japanese kamikaze attacks against U.S. naval forces operating off Luzon island in the Philippines.

It sits astride the Taiwan Strait, one of the most heavily traveled sea lanes in the world, and consequently lies across Japan's lifeline of oil from the Middle East

U.S. policy toward Taiwan takes into consideration the importance of a free Taiwan to Japan,⁵ as also to New Zealand and Australia, which latter has strong trading ties with Japan, exporting much of its iron and natural resources to Japan.

Taiwan is of strategic importance to another key U.S. ally, South Korea. Referring to the mutual trade relations and common bonds of democracy which link South Korea, Taiwan and Japan..."

⁹ p18, Thomas J. Christensen, The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2002.

¹⁰ Yoshihisa Amai; Kate Zhou; Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis; The Journal of Asian Studies; Ann Arbor; Aug 2001; "Ji concludes that the brinkmanship in the Taiwan Strait can be regarded as successful (at least domestically) because the Beijing leaders were able to use Taiwan as a vehicle to promote state-centric nationalism to replace the declining communism as the official state ideology."

¹¹ Dexter Roberts in Shanghai and Mark L. Clifford in Chongqing, with Bruce Einhorn in Taipei and Pete Engardio in New York; GREATER CHINA The mainland is absorbing the economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan faster than you think. How will this new superpower affect the world? Business Week; New York; Dec 9, 2002; "There are potential hazards to full-fledged economic integration. As Taiwanese and Hong Kong companies become more dependent on China for their manufacturing, components, engineering, and markets, they will become more vulnerable to a political or financial crisis there. Both remain distinct possibilities: China's banking system is in precarious shape, with an estimated \$700 billion in bad loans. Millions of angry workers with scant pensions are losing their jobs at state-owned industries, and labor protests are breaking out. "In a crisis, Chinese labor could become as destabilizing a force for the world economy as oil prices," says Ted Dean, managing director at information-technology consultant BDA (China) Ltd. in Beijing."

¹² p337, Reminiscences, McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, 1964.

¹³ p339, Reminiscences, McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, 1964.

¹⁴ p341, Reminiscences, McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, 1964.

¹⁵ James H Hughes; The People's Republic of China confronts Taiwan

The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies; Washington; Summer 2001; "This remained in force until 1978, when the U.S. government decided to recognize the PRC, but even since then the U.S. has not failed to recognize the strategic value of Taiwan.⁸ A free Taiwan has immense strategic value for the United States."

¹⁶ DAVID A. FULGHUM and ROBERT WALL; North Korea Nuke Crisis Complicates Iraq Buildup Russian, Turkish forces may support attack. U.S. eyes extra carriers for Taiwan Strait, Korean peninsula. Aviation Week & Space Technology; New York; Jan 6, 2003; "However, two additional U.S. carrier battle groups and two amphibious readiness groups are not bound for waters around Iraq, but rather for the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Straits, the Navy official said. "The idea is to keep the Chinese from thinking irrational thoughts," he said."

¹⁷ Dexter Roberts in Shanghai and Mark L. Clifford in Chongqing, with Bruce Einhorn in Taipei and Pete Engardio in New York; GREATER CHINA The mainland is absorbing the economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan faster than you think. How will this new superpower affect the world? Business Week; New York; Dec 9, 2002; "It plays a key behind-the-scenes role at advanced plants and research labs provided by multinationals such as Cisco Systems, Ford Motor, Nokia, Sony, and Motorola. "All of our Chinese plants are being built with Taiwanese managers," says Gerard J. Kleisterlee, CEO of Royal Philips Electronic."

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